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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GLENN T. SEAL and ZELMA T. SEAL,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
Case No. 15948
MAPLETON CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal
Corporation, by and through its Mayor
and Board of City Councilmen,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, Honorable David Sam, District Judge.

V. PERSHING NELSON
PATRICK B. NOLAN
ALDRICH & NELSON
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Respondent
THOMAS S. TAYLOR
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GLENN T. SEAL and ZELMA T. SEAL,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.
Case No. 15948
MAPLETON CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal
Corporation, by and through its Mayor
and Board of City Councilmen,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiffs and appellants for a
Writ of Mandamus to compel the respondent to approve plans for
the development of a subdivision or, in the alternative, for
alleged damages for the taking of property by eminent domain,
without just compensation.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court, at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case,
denied the appellants' request for a Writ of Mandamus, dismissed
the appellants' claim for alleged damages, for lack of evidence,
and granted respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, no
cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm
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the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At all times material hereto, appellants, Glenn T. Seal and
Zelma T. Seal, were husband and wife, and were the owners of
a certain tract of land, consisting of approximately 19.5 acres,
located within the corporate limits of respondent, Mapleton City
Corporation, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "City".
(Exhibits 12, 13, 20, 24)
Being desirous of developing the aforesaid land into a
subdivision, appellants first submitted to the Planning Commission
of Mapleton City a request for the re-zoning thereof from zoning
classification A-2 (agricultural zone) to zoning classification
RA-2

(residential agricultural zo:1e), which request was approved

by the Planning

Commiss~o:1

a~d

on or about November 13, l97
60, 62, 138)

fcrwarded to the City Council

~.

(Ex~ibits

20 and 12; TR., pp.

The Council discussed the request in its meeting

on November 19, 1974, and

schedul~d

matter for December 17, l :174.

a public hearing on the

(E·c'c.cbi ': 44)

At the public hear-

ing on the scheduled date, it Nas noted by members of the Planning
Commision that a plan should also be submitted within sixty to
ninecy days recommending certain changes in provisions of the
Master Plan as they related to subject property.

It was also

noted that twelve other adjoining property owners had indicated
a desire and intention to submit similar requests for zone changes
with respect to their properties.

(Exhibit 44)

At the City Council meeting which immediately followed the
Sponsored
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digitization
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for zone change, but the motion died for want of a second, and
the matter was deferred until the next Council meeting when it
was anticipated that two absent Council members would be present.
(Exhibit 44)

At the next Council meeting, on January 7, 1975,

the motion was renewed and, one Councilman still being absent,
the vote taken was two in favor of the zone change and two against,
whereupon the Mayor broke the tie by voting for the change and
the motion carried.

(Exhibit 24, 44; TR., pp. 63, 165)

Under Section 7-6-2 (2) of the Mapleton City Code, the
Residential Agricultural Zone (RA-2) permits Planned Dwelling
Units, but only when approved by the City Council after receiving
the recommendations of the Planning Commission.

At the next

meeting of the City Council, therefore, on January 21, 1975, it
was observed that the appellant might be proceeding with expensive
engineering and planning for the subdividing of his acreage and
Coun~ilman

Korth was directed to consult with Mr. Seal and assure

his understanding that the re-zoning of his property in no way
committed the City to the approval of his subdivision plans.

At

the same time, the City Engineer explained that the existing water
lines supplying that part of the City might be inadequate to
meet the requirements of the subdivision and a computer study was
authorized to determine the impact of extensive building in the
area on the water system.

(Exhibits 8 and 44)

At some point in time, contemporaneous with the foregoing
events, and at a closed "Executive" session of the City Planning
Commission, of which Mr. Seal was an Alternate Member, a decision
was reached to recommend to the City Council that certain roads
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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be deleted from the City Master Plan in order to accommodate the
1

appellants proposed subdivision.

This decision was not formally

entered in the official minutes of the Planning Commission until
July 9, 1975, having previously been forwarded to the City Council.
(Exhibits 19, 22, 44; TR., pp. 116-117, 198-189, 235)
The Master Street Plan of Mapleton City, adopted in 1958,
(Exhibit 18) contemplated concentrated growth in the center of
town, with gradual and orderly extensions outward.
204-205)

(TR., pp. 156,

Consistent therewith, a proposal of the Planning Commission

to re-zone the entire Northwest sector of the City for residential
purposes was rejected by the Council.

(TR., pp. 157, 158, 208)

Similarly, a proposed subdivision applied for by one "Carnesecca",
prior to the Seal application, and consisting of 240 homes located
in close proximity to the Seal subdivision, had ?reviously been
turned down by the Council.

(TR., pp. 181, 208)

This City policy

was affirmed by the Planning Commission at a Planning Commission
meeting held on February 12, 1975, where, on a prevailing vote
of three to two, the Commission expressed its consensus as favoring
the continuance of development along existing streets, rather
than planned development elsewhere.

(Exhibit 35, 44; TR., pp. 215,

216)
On April 9, 1975, a Preliminary Plat :or appellants'
proposed subdivison was presented to the City Planning Commission
by one Denny Murray, Mr. Seal's representative, who was also
himself an Alternate Member of the Planning Commission.
13, 31, and 32; TR., pp. 251 and 252)

(Exhibits

A motion to approve the

preliminary plat and recommend the same for approval to the City
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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problem be resolved.

(Exhibit 32; TR., pp. 66, 67, 100, 192-193,

231, 253)
At a meeting of the City Council held May 20, 1975, the
appellants requested that the Council review the preliminary
plat for the purpose of obtaining a "general feeling from the
Council", so they could determine whether or not to proceed with the
Final Plat.

(Exhibit 26; TR., pp. 194, 195, 265, 266) The plan

called for the development of forty-four (44)homes on lots
ranging from one-third acre to one-half acre, plus, and would
conflict and interfere

with the proposed 1400 North and

700-800 West Streets designated on the Master Street Plan.
(TR., pp. 194, 195, 265, 266)
It was noted at the meeting that a public hearing would be
required before any streets could be deleted from the Master
Plan.

(TR., pp. 265, 266)

In general terms, the appellants

proposed to limit construction in the proposed subdivision to
five homes per year for the first three years, with no restrictions
thereafter and to offer a lot in the subdivision to the City
for a recreational area.

In the same meeting, the Council also

discussed a proposed Interim Development Zone and took the Seal
subdivision matter under advisement.

(Exhibit 26; TR., pp. 184-185)

On June 3, 1975, the appellants appeared before the City
Council to discuss the use of an irrigation well owned by them
on other property, as a possible means of resolving the water
distribution problem.

The appellants indicated that they would

retain title to the well, but if they should ever decide to sell
it, the City would be given the first right of refusal to purchase
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the same.

(Exhibit 27; TR., pp. 292, 294, 373)

The Council

indicated that the water problem was one of distribution rather
than supply, because smaller water lines leading from the City's
water sources empty into larger pipes within the City and the
flow of water in the larger pipes is limited to the quantity
which the smaller pipes can convey.

(TR., pp. 24, 33, 34, 72)

On July 1, 1975, a public hearing was held to consider
the recommendation of the City Planning Commission that the
Council delete from the Master Plan those streets conflicting
with or affected by the proposed subdivision.

At the subsequent

meeting of the City Council, immediately following, a motion was
made to

de~

such streets from the Master Plan, but was defeated

by a vote of three to two, whereupon, the Mayor appointed a
Special Committee to discuss the matter further with the appellants
and to determine the effect of the Interim Development Zone, if
adopted, on future development.

(Exhibit 36)

In general terms,

Mr. Seal proposed to the Special Committee certain actions designed
to meet the City's objections to the subdivision, including, among
others, a first option to purchase the appellants' irrigation well,
if the appellants should ever determine to sell the same; the
conveyance to the City, for recreational purposes, of a single lot
in the subdivision, with the express condition that the lot could
not be traded or sold for the purpose of acquiring a larger
tract for recreational purposes in any other area; and an escrow
arrangement to insure the installation of off-site improvements
by depositing the sum of $700.00 as and when each lot were sold
in the
proposed subdivision, for the construction of a hard
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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surface road, curb, gutter, and sidewalk as each home was constructed, all of which proposals fell short of satisfying the
requirements of the ordinance and meeting the objections of the
Council.

(Exhibits 36 and 23; TR., pp. 292, 293, 294, 329)

After another month of study and consideration, the City
Council met again on August 5, 1975, after a public hearing
relating to the establishment of an Interim Development Zone,
at which time a motion was made to approve the Preliminary Plat
of the appellants' proposed subdivision.
by a majority vote of three to two.
332-333)

The motion was defeated

(Exhibit 29, 44; TR., pp. 269,

Among the plethora of reasons for refusing to approve

the appellants' preliminary plat, are the following, as set
forth in a letter from the City to the appellants dated October
6, 1977.
1.

(Exhbit 43):
In the judgment of the City, the approval of the pro-

posed subdivision would result in the impairment of City Services
to the other inhabitants of the City and necessitate the imposition of an impossible tax burden on all City residents, in order
to provide necessary municipal services.
2.

The proposed subdivision, as represented by the Pre-

liminary Plat, conflicts with the Master Street Plan of the City,
and a proposal to delete the affected streets from the Master
Plan was rejected.
3.

No "Final" Plat of the proposed subdivision was ever

submitted to the City prior to the commencement of the appellants'
action, as required by provisions of the Mapleton City Code and the
time for submitting such "Final" Plat, after approval by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Planning Commission of the Preliminary Plat and all extensions
granted in connection therewith, had long expired.
4.

The City's water distribution and delivery system is

not adequate to accommodate the requirements of the proposed
subdivision without substantially impairing the ability of the
City to fulfill the service requirements of present water-using
inhabitants of the City and without imposing upon the City and its
taxpayers an inordinate financial burden beyond the capacity of
the City to meet.

(Exhibit 8, 44)

The proposals of the appellants

for use of their irrigation water well for culinary purposes was
carefully analyzed.
5.

The proposed subdivision did not comply with the Utah

County Health Department regulations regarding soil percolation
tests for septic tanks.

The Utah State Board of Health had

already refused to approve the installation of septic tanks in
the proposed "Carnesecca" subdivision which showed a more
favorable drainage classification than land embraced in the
Seal proposed subdivision.

(Exhibit 33; TR., pp. 117, 118,

120, 181, 208, 209, 210)
On June 21, 1977, more than two years after the "conditional"
approval of the appellants' Preliminary Plat by the City Planning
Commission, and long after the pending action had been commenced,
the appellants belatedly submitted to the City Council a purported
"Final" plat of the subdivision, which was never filed with the
Planning Commission, as required by ordinance.

(Exhibit 38;

TR., pp. 196, 198, 203, 204, 245, 255, 258; Mapleton City Code,
1971, Sections 9-6-3, 9-6-4, 9-6-5)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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No appeal was ever taken by the appellants to the Board of
Adjustment of Mapleton City from any action taken or decision
made by the City Council as provided by Ordinance.

(Mapleton

City Code, 1971, Section 7-4-3)
Under this state of facts, Judge Sorensen, while presiding
over the case, ruled at pre-trial, that the appellants had not
exhausted their "administrative remedies"
Entry December 17, 1976).

(Court file Minute

Following that ruling, the appellants

asked for a change of judge and Judge Sam, to whom the case was
assigned, out of an abundance of consideration for the appellants,
set the case for trial and heard the same for approximately five
days and until the appellants rested their case.
The appellants, at no time filed any verified claim for
damages allegedly s•lstained by them as a result of any acts or
omissions of the respondent, either before or after the filing
of their Complaint in this action, and offered no evidence whatever at the trial of any damage sustained.

(Affidavit of City

Recorder attached to respondent's motion for Summary Judgment;
TR.

I

pp. 426)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANTS HAVE NOT FOLLOWED THE PROCEDURES
SPECIFIED OR COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIFl!1ENTS OF THE
MAPLETON CITY CODE RELATING TO SUBDIVISIONS AND HAVE
NOT EXHAUSTED THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Contrary to the position taken by the appellants at trial,

the inclusion of a particular tract of land in a particular "zone"
does not, automatically, entitle the property owner to approval
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-9OCR, may contain errors.

of any subdivisional plans he may submit or to the issuance of
blanket building permits.

Section 7-6-2 (2) of the Mapleton City

Code permits "planned dwelling units" in Residential Agricultural
Zone RA-2, but only when approved by the City Council after
receiving the recommendations of the Planning Commission.

The

appellants' responsibilities, therefore, did not end when the
zoning classification of their property was changed from Agricultural zone A-2 to Residential Agricultural zone RA-2 on January 7,
1975.

(Exhibit 24) The procedures and requirements for securing

approval of subdivisional plans are spelled out clearly in
Sections 9-6-1 through 9-6-16 of the Mapleton City Code, 1971.
The record before this Court demonstrates graphically that there
was barely more than a semblance of compliance by the appellants
with the requirements of the Ordinance.

First of all, the

appellants and the subdivision which they proposed clearly fall
within the definition of subdividers and subdivisions set out
in Section 9-6-1 of the Mapleton City Code.

Second, Section

9-6-2 of the Code provides that no person shall subdivide any
tract of land nor sell, offer for sale, or exchange any parcel
of land which is part of a subdivision unless there shall first
be recorded a plat of such land which has been prepared and
recorded in compliance with the requirements of the ordinance.
Section 9-6-4 of the Code requires the subdivider to file a
"Preliminary Plat" and provides that the Planning Commission
or the City Council may approve or reject such plat or grant
approval on conditions stated.

This Section further provides

that Sponsored
approval
of the Preliminary Plat by the Planning Commission
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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or City Council shall not constitute "final" acceptance of the
subdivision by the Planning Commission or the City Council.
Subparagraph (C) of the same Section provides that approval of
the Preliminary Plat by the Planning Commission shall be valid
for a maximum of sixty (60) days after approval, unless upon
application of the developer, the Planning Commission shall have
granted an extension and if the "final" plat has not been recorded
within the time required by the Ordinance, the Preliminary Plat
must again be submitted to the Planning Commission for re-approval.
In this case, the Preliminary Plat "conditionally" approved by
the Planning Commission and referred voluntarily by the appellants
to the City Council for the Council's review, was invalid at
the time of the commencement of trial and at the present time,
because no "final" plat was filed with the Council or recorded
within the time required by the Ordinance, including the sixty
day extension granted to the appellants by the Planning Commission
and no "Final" Plat has, in fact, ever been filed with the
Planning Commission or recorded.

Further, the condition upon

which the "Preliminary" Plat was approved by the Planning Commission
has never been resolved.

(TR., pp. 196, 198, 203, 204, 245, 255,

258; Mapleton City Code, 1971, Sections 9-6-3, 4, 5)
Section 9-6-5 {A) of the Code provides that after compliance
with the provisions of the Ordinance relating to the "Preliminary"
Plat, the subdividers shall submit to the Planning Commission a
"Final" Plat with two black and white prints of the subdivison.
Such "Final" Plat has never been submitted to the Planning
Commission and a purported "Final" Plat was tendered to the City
Sponsoredonly
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the conditional approval of the "Preliminary" Plat by the Planning
Commission and approximately one year after the pending action
was commenced.

In fact, the appellants have never submitted to

the City Council a "Final" Plat approved by the Planning Commission,
incorporating and complying with the requirements of a "Final"
Plat as set forth in Section 9-6-5 of the Code.
Although not technically required to approve or disapprove
the "Preliminary" Plat, in view of the provisions of Section 9-6-4
(B) of the City Code, the City

Cou~cil,

at the request of and as an

accommodation to the appellants, nevertheless reviewed and advised
the appellants of their disapproval of the same, citing multiple
reasons therefor.

There was never any follow-through by the

appellants by w-ay of proper submission of a "Final" Plat
for review and consideration by the Council.
Further, no action taken or omitted by the City Council,
whether considered advisory or otherwise, was ever the subject
of an appeal by the appellants to the Board of Adjustment of the
City, which is empowered under the provisions of Section 7-4-3 of
the Mapleton City Code to hear and decide appeals where it is
alleged by the appellants that there is error in any order,
requirement, decision, or refusal made in the enforcement of
the Ordinance.
Judge Sorensen in his ruling at pre-trial as noted in the
Court file Minute Entry of December 17, 1976, and Judge Sam, in
his Findings and Decision of June 14, 1978, properly ruled that
the appellants never did exhaust their administrative remedies
prior to the commencement of suit.
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The well-established doctrine of "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies" requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought by exhausting this
remedy before the Courts will act.
595.)

(2 Am. Jur. 2nd 426, Section

This doctrine is well-established, is a cardinal principle

of practically universal application and no one is entitled to
judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.
Jur. 2nd 428, Section 595, citing:
CORP., 327 US

540, 90 I.Ed

(2 Am.

MACCAULEY v. WATERMAN S. S.

839, 66 Set 712)

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
sometimes said to rest upon the presumption that the administrative agency, if given a complete chance to pass upon the
matter, will decide correctly and is merely one aspect of the
broader doctrine which requires final administrative action as
a prerequisite of judicial review.

(FLORENTINE v. DARIEN, 142

Conn. 415, 115 A. 2d 328; THOMAS v. RAMBERG, 240 Minn. 1, 60
NW 2nd 18; CAVANAUGH v. UNDERWRITERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
(Tex. Civ. App.)

231

sw

2nd 753)

The doctrine has been applied

in those cases where the plaintiff has altogether failed to invoke
his administrative remedies, as in this case (YAKUS v. United
States, 321 US 414, 88 LEd 834, 64 Set 660; WILLIAMS v. BANKERS
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 80

Ariz. 294, 297 P 2d 344) and

in those cases where the plaintiff has failed to properly apply
for a license or permit or for variation of zoning restrictions
imposed by a City.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANTS HAVE MADE NO SHOWING THAT ACTIONS OF THE
RESPONDENT WERE ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND THE RECORD,
TO THE CONTRARY, DISCLOSES THAT, IN FACT, THEY WERE NOT.
Whether actions and decisions of the City Council in disapproving the "Preliminary" Plat of the appellants after its
"conditional" approval by the Planning Commission are considered
"advisory" or otherwise, there is not a scintilla of evidence in
the record in support of the appellants' claim that such actions
or decisions were "arbitrary or capricious".

Technical deficiencies

in the procedures followed by the appellants in filing their
"Preliminary" Plat and in failing to file any "Final" Plat, aside,
the record affirmatively shows that the proposal of the appellants
was thoroughly reviewed and given careful consideration by the
Council over an extended period of time, and the action taken
by the respondent was fully warranted and justified by the facts.
First, it should be noted that the Preliminary Plat was
approved "conditionally" by the Planning Commission and that
condition specifically required that the recognized water problem
be resolved.

The fact that the appellants made certain proposals

relating to the use of water from their irrigation well, which
were unacceptable to the respondent, did not constitute a resolution of the problem.

The City tried strenuously to work out

the problem with the appellants and appointed a Special Committee
to undertake that endeavor.

(Exhibits 13, 32, 36, 23; TR., pp. 32)

It was recognized that a solution of the water problem was essential.
(TR., pp. 72)

The City Engineer, Mr. Wilson, advised the City
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date the subdivision without impairing water pressure and supply
(Exhibits 43, 44; TR.,

to the other inhabitants of the City,
pp.

24) and the evidence discloses that although some six inch

and some eight inch lines border the proposed subdivision, they
are fed from the water sources by lines of a smaller size which,
in effect, limits the quantity of water which the larger pipes
can convey, to the quantity of water the smaller pipes can carry.
(TR., pp. 24, 33, 34)

The proposals made by the appellants,

most of which were submitted after this action was commenced,
did not, in the judgment of the Council, offer a viable and
acceptable solution to the problem.
never resolved.

The problem was, in fact,

(TR., pp. 100)

Second, there was an obvious conflict between the "Prelirninary" Plat of the subdivision and the Master Street Plan
(Exhibits 2, 18) and an

arnend~ent

of that plan was imperative

if the subdivions were to be approved.
Section 2-2-9 of the Mapleton City Code, 1971, provides
that in order to preserve the integrity of the official map
no permit shall be issued by the Building Inspector for any
building or structure or part thereof on any land located between the mapped lines of any street as shown on the official
Map and that any person

~grieved

by his inability to obtain

such a permit may appeal to the Board of Adjustment.

Further,

Section 2-2-11 of the Code provides:
"Whenever the Planning Commission shall have certified
a Master Plan or any part thereof to the Council, and
the Council shall have adopted the plan, thenceforth
all streets, arks, or other public grounds, public
buildin s or structures, and publ~c ut~ ~t~es, w ether
publicly or privately owned, shall be constructe ~n
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Considering the proposed addition of a multitude of new homes
in the area and the traffic problems anticipated therefrom, the
Council, in its judgment concluded that the deletion of the affected
streets from the Master Plan was not in the interest of the City
and its inhabitants, and therefore declined to amend the Master
Plan to accomplish that objective.
Third,

(TR., pp. 106, 111, 234)

no percolation tests were ever provided by the

appellants nor were the sewer problems in connection therewith
ever resolved.

While there was some testimony to the ef::ct

that the area embraced in the proposed subdivision was adaptable
to septic tanks (TR., pp. 186), it was admitted by the same
witness that the adequacy of soil conditions for septic tanks,
could not be determined without soil percolation tests, TR., pp. 186)
yet no such tests were ever made
hand, an overlay showing salls

(~R.,

a~d

pp. 123).

drainage

On the other

co~ditions

of both

the "Carnesecca" and "Seal" ;:>roposed subdivisons disclosed that
the "Carnesecca" subdivision land was classified as "good"
whereas the "Seal" land was

classif~ed

as only "fair", yet the

State of Utah found that the drainage in the "Carnesecca" tract
was inadequate for septic tanks and refused to sanction the
subdivision.

(Exhibit 33; TR., pp. 208, 209, 210)

On the basis

of these facts, the City was fully justified in concluding that
sewage disposal problems incident to the subdivision were not
resolved.
Inasmuch as no "Final" Plat was ever filed with the Planning
Commission or the City Council before the pending action was
commenced, and inasmuch as the purported "Final" Plat filed with
the City
Council on June 21, 1977, long after the pending action was
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begun, was clearly deficient in meeting the requirements for
a "Final" Plat, including dedication of streets, percolation
tests, the installation of permanent survey stakes, and the
required approval of the Planning Commission and Engineer,
there was no opportunity afforded the City Council to review
and approve or

disapprove a properly executed "Final" Plat.

(Exhibit 38; TR., pp.

25~

259)

Fourth, from policy considerations alone, it was within
the power of the City to control growth in given areas, if that
had been the City's purpose, in order to bring about an orderly
development of the City's large land area compatible with
community needs and the City's ability to meet the financial
burden incident to such development.

In the case of

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF SONOMA COUNTY v. THE CITY
OF PETALUMA, reported at 522 Federal 2nd 897, the City appealed
from a decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California which had voided, as unconstitutional, certain aspects of such a developmental plan.

The

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the District Court on August 13, 1975, and certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court on February 23, 1976.
(96 S.Ct. 1148)
Although the burdenwas upon the appellantsto establish by
competent proof that the actions of the respondent were "arbitrary
and capricious", there is nothing in the record to support the
appellants'claim and the Court, in its decision of June 14, 1978,
so found.
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POINT III
THERE IS NO BASIS WHATEVER IN THE RECORD UPON WHICH
THE APPELLANTS CAN ESTABLISH ANY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
AS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT.
First of all, as established by the uncontroverted Affidavit
of the City Recorder filed in support of the respondent's Motion
for Summary Judgment, no verified claim for damages was ever presented to or filed with the respondent by the appellants, and such
filing is a condition precedent to any enforceable claim against
the City for money damages.

After providing for certain excep1

tions which are not applicable to the appellants claim, title
10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides:
" ..• Every claim other than claims above mentioned,
against any city or town must be presented, properly
itemized or described and verified as to correctness
by the claimant or his agent, to the governing body
within one (1) year after the last item of such account
or claim accrued . . . . "
The same Section

f~rther

provides that no action shall be

maintained against any City or town for damages or injury to
persons or property unless it appears that the claim for which
the action was brought was presented as aforesaid, and that
such governing body did not, within ninety (90) days thereafter,
audit and allow the same.
The appellants have never made any claim that they have ever
filed such a verified claim and under these conditions their
claim for money damages cannot be entertained or sustained.
The statutory right to recover, granted by Section 10-7-77,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, can be availed of only
when there has been a compliance with the conditions upon which
such right is conferred and one who seeks to enforce the right
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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must, by allegation and proof, bring himself within the conditions prescribed thereby.

(HAMILTON v. SALT LAKE CITY, 99 Utah

362, 106 P. 2d 1028)
The appellants in this case have claimed that the action of
the respondent City in connection with the Preliminary Plat
filed by the appellants was wrongful.

That claim is, of itself,

equivalent to a claim that the action or failure to act was
tortious.
In the case of DAHL v. SALT LAKE CITY, 45 Utah 544, 147
P.

622, the Court observed that it should be noticed that

the claims which must be presented before an action can be
brought and successfully maintained thereon are divided into
two classes:
injury alleged

one class consisting of claims "for damages or
to have been caused by the defective, unsafe,

dangerous or obstructed condition of any street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, or bridge" which must be presented
within thirty (30) days after the happening of such injury or
damage, and the second class consisting of "every claim, other
than the claims above mentioned", must be presented, properly
itemized or described within one year after the last item of
such account or claim accrued.
Title 10-7-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, expressly provides:
"It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any action or
proceeding against the City or town in any Court for the
collection of any claim mentioned in Section 10-7-77,
that such claim had not been presented to the governing
body of such City or town in the manner and within the
time specified in Section 10-7-77; ... "
Implementing the foregoing Section, this Court, in HURLEY
v. TOWN OF BINGHAM, 63

Utah 589, 228

P. 213, held that pre-
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sentation of a claim within the time fixed by law was a condition
precedent to bringing action against the town and that failure
to file a claim barred any action against the town and any consideration of the claim by the town did not constitute a waiver
of the filing thereof by the claimant.

(See also THOMAS E.

JEREMY EST. v. SALT LAKE CITY, 87 Utah

370, 49 P. 2nd 405)

It should be noted, also, that the record is totally destitute of any evidence whatever of any damage to the appellants
by virtue of any acts or omissions of the respondent, and the
Court, in its decision of June 14, 1978, so found.

(TR.

I

pp. 426)

Further, the decision of the City Council in matters of the kind
now pending before this Court is "governmental" in nature and
not proprietary and the City and its officers cannot be held
accountable in damages by reason thereof.
Title 63-30-3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
(Governmental Immunity Act) provides:
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all
governmental entities shall be immune from suit for
any injury which may result from the activities of
said entities wherein said entity is engaged in the
exercise and discharge of a governmental function."
There follows

certain exceptions, including quiet title

actions, foreclosure actions, actions for injuries from
negligent operation of motor vehicles, injuries caused by
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges,
or other structures, public buildings, or improvements, or injuries
proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of employees
of the City committed within the scope of their employment.

The

appellants have not brought themselves within the definition of
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any of the foregoing exceptions and the general rule is, therefore,
applicable.
The test in deciding whether the government is acting in
a proprietary or governmental capacity is whether the act is
for the common good of all without the element of special
corporate benefit or pecuniary profit.
CORP., 1 Utah 2nd 244, 265 P. 2d

(DAVIS v. PROVO CITY

415) and a City is liable

in damages when it is negligent while acting in a proprietary
capacity, but exempt from liabilty when it is negligent in the
performance of governmental duties.

The actions taken by the

respondent in this case can only be characterized as "governmental"

in nature.
The appellants' claim of damages by reason of the alleged
unlawful taking of property without just compensation, through
eminent domain is equally without merit.
In the first place, the respondent has brought no action
against the appellants in the nature of aneminent domain
proceeding, or

otherwis~

appellants' property.

and has not sought to obtain title to

The appellants' claim can only be

characterized as an attempt to establish by the judgment of
this Court, that restrictions in the use of property imposed
upon a property owner through the police power of a City
constitutes an unlawful taking of that property.

More

specifically, the appellants' claim that because property is
designated on a Master Street Plan of the City for future
development and implementation and certain limitations are
imposed relating to construction thereon, this constitutes
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cases are cited which support that proposition.

On the contrary,

Section 2-2-8 of the Mapleton City Code, 1971, expressly refutes
such a claim.

That Section provides that the placing of any

street or street lines upon the official map shall not in and
of itself, constitute or be deemed to constitute the opening
or establishment of any street or the taking or acceptance of
any land for street purposes.

If and when the City should

determine to implement the Master Street Plan, in any area, and
private property is required for that purpose, it can be assumed
that the owner thereof will be compenstated therefor.

Until

then, the property has not been taken and the mere adoption of
the Master Plan does not render such action compensable.
On top of all of this, the appellants offered no evidence
whatever, at trial, of any damage sustained by them as a result
of responden~s actions.

(TR., pp. 426)
POINT IV

THE OFFICE AND PURPOSE OF MANDk~S IS TO COMPEL LAWFUL
ACTION BUT NOT TO DICTATE OR CONTROL THE CITY'S DECISIONS.
~

public officer is in duty bound to exercise the
judgment or discretion which is reposed in him by
law.
If he fails or refuses to do so, and does not
act upon the subject or pass upon the question on
which judgment or discretion is to be exercised,
then the Writ of Mandamus may be used to enforce
obedience to the law.
In other words, when in matters
involving discretion, the respondent refuses to act
at all, mandamus may issue to move him to action and
to exercise his discretion in the matter.
(Citing SMYTH v. BUTTERS, 38 Utah 151, 112 P. 809) ...
The relator in such case merely asks that the respondent
make a decision one way or the other. He does not seek to
use the Writ to compel or control the decision in any particular way, as will be seen, this cannot be done.
(52 Am. Jur.
2d 398, Section 77)
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Although, as has been aeen, mandamus may be resorted
to for the purpose of compelling the exercising of
official discretion, the use of the Writ will not
ordinarily be extended so as to interfere with the
manner in which the discretion is exercised or to
influence or coerce a particular determination.
(Citing MCCARTEN v. SANDERSON, 11 Montana 407, 109
P. 2dll08, 132 ALR 1229)
It has been reiterated that
in the absence of a capricious or arbitrary act,
mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
official discretion or to alter or review action taken
in the proper exercise of such discretion or judgment.
(Citing SMYTH v. BUTTERS, 38 Utah 151, 112 P. 809)
Thus, mandamus will not lie to control the discretion
of the Court or judicial officer, or to compel its exercise
in a particular manner, except in those rare instances
where under the facts, it can be legally exercised in
but one way, nor is it a proper remedy to control acts
of governmental bodies when acting within the scope of
their legal powers.
(Citing GOODMAN v. MEADE, 162
PA.Super. 587, 68A2nd 577). Mandamus is not an instrument for the instruction of public officers as to the
manner in ~hich they shall discharge duties which call
for the exercise of discretion, as distinguished from the
performance of ministerial duties.
(Citing WOLF v. YOUNG,
Texas Civil Appeals 277 SW 2nd 744)
Mandamus is used to stimulate action pursuant to some
legal duty, and is not to cause the respondent to un-do
action already taken, or to correct or review such
action however erroneous it may have been.
(Citing
STATE EX REL,ROBINSON v. HUTCHESON, 180 Tennessee 46,
171 SW 2nd 282, 168 ALR 850)
Mandamus is not a subsitute for, and cannot be resorted
to in civil proceedings to serve the purpose of certiorari,
appeal, or writ of error, and this is true even though
there is no mode of review given by or available under
the law . . • . (52 Am. Jur. 2nd 337, Section 9)
Where there is no other adequate remedy, mandamus will
issue to enforce performance of plain and imperative
duties of aministerial character imposed by law upon
administrative bodies. The writ will not issue to
control judgment or discretion. Unless there has been
a clear abuse of discretion, or the action of the
agency was arbitrar¥• capricious! or prompted by wrongful motives, where JUdgment or d scretion is reposed
in an administrative agency and has, by that agency been
exercised, courts are powerless to use the writ of
mandamus to compel a different conclusion.
(US EX REL.
CHICAGO G.W.R. COMPANY v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,
294 us 50)"
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The foregoing principles of law prevail in the State of Utah.
In the case of TUTTLE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT LAKE CITY,
77 Utah 270, 285; 294 P 294, this Court said that mandate does
not lie unless the relator or petitioner shows a clear legal
right to performance of the act demanded and the plain duty of
the officer, board, or tribunal to perform it, as demanded, and
where the duty to perform the act is doubtful, or where a
discretion is imposed or involved in the performance of it,
mandate ordinarily will not compel the performance of it in
a particular way.

A Writ of Mandamus may be used to compel an

inferior tribunal to act on a matter within its jurisdiction,
but not to control its discretion while acting, nor to reverse
its judgment when made.

(HATHAWAY v. MCCONKIE, 85 Utah 21, 38

P. 2d 300)
The action of a

p~lic

~fficer

in a situation calling for

the exercise of discretion is not reviewable by mandamus unless
such officer has been guilty of clear and willful disregard of
duty or acts with caprice or partiality.
v.

(STATE EX REL.BISHOP

MOREHOUSE, 38 Utah 234, 112 P. 169)
In distinguishing between ministerial duties and duties

involving judgment or discretion, the general rule is that in
matters involving interpretation of a statute, the officer or
board acts with judgment and discretion.
"A duty or act is ministerial in the sense herein
intended when there is no room for the exercise of
discretion, off~c~al or otherw~se, the performance
be~ng required by direct and positive command of the law ...
But a duty is regarded as involving the character of
judgmen~ or discretion, and cannot be controlled by
mandamus, where it is not thus plainly prescribed or
depends upon a statute or statutes, the construction
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Where the duty is not plainly prescribed, but is to
be gathered by doubtful inference from a statute or
statutes of uncertain meaning, it is to be regarded
as involving the character of judgment or discretion
which may not be controlled by mandamus, even though
the Court may deem the conclusion reached to be erroneous.
(52 Am. Jur. 2nd 402, Section 80, 81, and 82)"
The issuance of licenses or permits by boards and officers
charged with that responsibility is a discretionary function.
"Boards and officers charged with the duty or power of
issuing licenses and permits usually exercise a discretionary function in the matter. Their determination
involves a judgment as to the right and fitness of the
applicant and generally calls for examining evidence
and passing upon questions of fact.
Where such is the
case, Courts may compel them to exercise their judgment
or discretion, but will not attempt to control their
discretion or compel them by mandamus to decide in a
particular way.
If in the proper exercise of their
power they refuse a license or permit, the writ will
not issue to reverse or review their decision.
(ANNO:
20 ALR 1482; 29 ALR 41, 42; 53 ALR 149, 153;
72 ALR 1339; 124 ALR 247, 249)"
The foregoing rule

which accords to officers and boards

a status of judgment and discretion in the exercise of their
powers in issuing permits

a~d

interpreting ordinances is adhered

to by the Courts of this State.
In NAYLOR v. SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 17 Utah 2nd

300,

410 P. 2d 764, the Court said:
"The (zoning) Commission being charged with the duty
of carrying out these numerous and varied objectives
must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude of discretion as to the manner in which they can best be
attained. In conformity with well-established rules
relating to t~e power of administrative bodies, it is
to be assumed that they have some specialized knowledge
of the conditions and the needs upon which the discharge
of their duties depends. Because the law imposes this
duty primarily upon the commission, and because of its
presumed expertise in fulfiling that responsibility,
the Court will not invade the province of the commission
and substitute its judgment therefor; nor will it interfere
w~th the preorogatives of the commission unless it is
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shown to be so clearly in error that there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action
must therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary.
(See also, GAY~ v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, 11 Utah 2nd
307, 358 P. 2d 633)"
The meaning of the terms "arbitrary and capricious" in connection with municipal zoning is succinctly set forth by the Court in
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES v. MULLEN, 214 Oregon 281; 330 P. 2d 5, as
follows:
"The terms "arbitrary and capricious" action when used in
connection with determining the validity of action of
municipal zoning authorities means willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard
of facts and circumstances of the case, and where there
is room for two opinions, the action is not arbitrary
or capricious if exercised honestly and upon due consideration even though it may be believed that an erroneous
conclusion has been reached."
Further, the burden of proving its right to a Writ of
Mandamus rests upon the appellants and all presumptions are in
favor of the respondent.

When the appellants applied for a

Writ of Mandamus, the burden of proving their entitlement thereto rested upon them and all presumptions are against in them
and in favor of the respondent.
"The rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party
who asserts the affirmative of an issue applies in
mandamus proceedings. Thus, the burden is upon the
applicant to show that his right to the issuance of
the writ is clear and indisputable and, except as to
allegations that are admitted by the answer or otherwise, he must prove every fact that is the foundation
of his proceeding. He must show an enforceable right;
an imperative duty of the respondent to perform; the
authority, ability and means of the respondent of
performing his duty; the lack of another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; the performance or compliance
with necessary conditions precedent, including, where
necessary, a demand for performance and refusal thereof;
and, if the duty in question is discretionary, that
there was an arbitrary exercise or abuse of discretion . . . .
(52 Am. Jur. 2nd 786, Section 466) ."
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Commissioners denying an application for permit to construct
and operate a mobile homes park, had the burden of establishing
their cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence and it
was incumbent upon them to show

unreasonab~ess

of such action.

A court, in an action to review a County Commissioners' denial
of permit may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioners, and should not declare the action of the
Commissioners unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so
by the evidence in the light of the presumption that the
Commissioners acted reasonably.

(CRETEN v. BOARD OF COUNTY

COMMISSIONERS OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY, 204 Kansas

782, 466 P. 2d

263; COE v. ALBUQUERQUE, 76 New Mexico 77; 418 P. 2d 545)
It was held in the case of MUELLER v. CITY OF PHOENIX
EX REL.PHOENIX BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, 102 Arizona 575, 435 P. 2d
472, that a presumption of •.·alidity exists in favor of a Board
of Adjustment determination and one who attacks such determination is met with the presumption and carries the burden of
showing the decision to be against the weight of the evidence
and unreasonable, erroneous, or illegal, as a matter of law.
The Courts of this State have adopted the foregoing
principles.

(See MORRISON v. HORNE, 12 Utah 2nd 131, 363 P. 2d

1113)

CONCLUSION
For the reasons and upon the authorities set out herein,
it is respectfully submitted that the Findings and Judgment
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of the Trial Court entered June 14, 1978, should be affirmed.
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